main/curl: security fixes

CVE-2018-16890, CVE-2019-3822, CVE-2019-3823

Fixes #9994

4 files changed, 104 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/main/curl/APKBUILD b/main/curl/APKBUILD
index d13c3e072e..20dbf82626 100644
--- a/main/curl/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/curl/APKBUILD
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=curl
 pkgver=7.61.1
-pkgrel=1
+pkgrel=2
 pkgdesc="URL retrival utility and library"
 url="https://curl.haxx.se"
 arch="all"
@@ -19,10 +19,17 @@ source="https://curl.haxx.se/download/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.xz
         CVE-2018-16839.patch
         CVE-2018-16840.patch
         CVE-2018-16842.patch
+        CVE-2018-16890.patch
+        CVE-2019-3822.patch
+        CVE-2019-3823.patch
         "
 builddir="$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver"
 
 # secfixes:
+#   7.61.1-r2:
+#     - CVE-2018-16890
+#     - CVE-2019-3822
+#     - CVE-2019-3823
 #   7.61.1-r1:
 #     - CVE-2018-16839
 #     - CVE-2018-16840
@@ -121,4 +128,7 @@ sha512sums="e6f82a7292c70841162480c8880d25046bcfa64058f4ff76f7d398c85da569af1c24
 708527e73f9512c50e2250ca26786ba8994dc05fd2e362c1feb274e251219fb4bfc97e7e7722aa12424ccaf4c511d90d8820561c82a24f103b9ee2b743f4be28  use-OPENSSL_config.patch
 4a28e4dcf36bf8e2fc5658d7fcee311d29452f4bed1479bad02772a8b7969c9dc653480b85715a5fe2bd2c2a8ae59e94fe72ffc6d0fe765131010d8f64bdfaee  CVE-2018-16839.patch
 c1a684f17267b08f77625064ac62e4f06989c552d6d501565f8bebf31d3a96a613f0683376ec7cc16f6489554dcca4dcb1d428461159b82434c076df44ef5b38  CVE-2018-16840.patch
-dcaca036eafaaae66eba99808d00ff6bed3c9e59c2c1239ca1ddcf54c9e1c53edabd543dc6925ded3cdf9efd39c0968353527ae5ed0b986cefba333fbc7fd1af  CVE-2018-16842.patch"
+dcaca036eafaaae66eba99808d00ff6bed3c9e59c2c1239ca1ddcf54c9e1c53edabd543dc6925ded3cdf9efd39c0968353527ae5ed0b986cefba333fbc7fd1af  CVE-2018-16842.patch
+573b896bd78e404002398bdf38d952ec6247af551ef7d6e34d52acbf004f8f4de60299e3a8f83be75e22dfb8731e466aea0253efec7116282afab32dbb1f66e8  CVE-2018-16890.patch
+959a55237752b254bc5f58308607f3cf0475e207a7400ff6be7942c48131787f1dec4c05be5b76865ae0adf81ebae77774085ad0c19dd342fb0307cfcfe24b6c  CVE-2019-3822.patch
+73f0d06f9bbd6f0688e67310120d1e806752626c103b0a52bc4b4a1a77bbe248885778f39386fbfc38cb534cd12d18f205c091769558e6a04b50010cb9ba6a69  CVE-2019-3823.patch"
diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2018-16890.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2018-16890.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9509c14058
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/curl/CVE-2018-16890.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From a54ba07a3a01f21de64ecabaafcc01b40b9db5a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Wed, 2 Jan 2019 20:33:08 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/3] NTLM: fix size check condition for type2 received data
+
+Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian
+---
+ lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 7 ++++---
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
++++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
+@@ -180,10 +180,11 @@
+     target_info_len = Curl_read16_le(&buffer[40]);
+     target_info_offset = Curl_read32_le(&buffer[44]);
+     if(target_info_len > 0) {
+-      if(((target_info_offset + target_info_len) > size) ||
++      if((target_info_offset >= size) ||
++         ((target_info_offset + target_info_len) > size) ||
+          (target_info_offset < 48)) {
+         infof(data, "NTLM handshake failure (bad type-2 message). "
+-                    "Target Info Offset Len is set incorrect by the peer\n");
++              "Target Info Offset Len is set incorrect by the peer\n");
+         return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING;
+       }
+ 
diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2019-3822.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2019-3822.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..938926b1d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/curl/CVE-2019-3822.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From 50c9484278c63b958655a717844f0721263939cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2019 12:59:28 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] ntlm: fix *_type3_message size check to avoid buffer overflow
+
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2019-3822.html
+Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian
+CVE-2019-3822
+---
+ lib/vauth/ntlm.c | 11 +++++++----
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
+index 0ad4d972e3..6a8fc5ab3d 100644
+--- a/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
++++ b/lib/vauth/ntlm.c
+@@ -779,11 +779,14 @@ CURLcode Curl_auth_create_ntlm_type3_message(struct Curl_easy *data,
+   });
+ 
+ #ifdef USE_NTRESPONSES
+-  if(size < (NTLM_BUFSIZE - ntresplen)) {
+-    DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
+-    memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
+-    size += ntresplen;
++  /* ntresplen + size should not be risking an integer overflow here */
++  if(ntresplen + size > sizeof(ntlmbuf)) {
++    failf(data, "incoming NTLM message too big");
++    return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+   }
++  DEBUGASSERT(size == (size_t)ntrespoff);
++  memcpy(&ntlmbuf[size], ptr_ntresp, ntresplen);
++  size += ntresplen;
+ 
+   DEBUG_OUT({
+     fprintf(stderr, "\n   ntresp=");
diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0023b9b0b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/curl/CVE-2019-3823.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 89dd3f49e1248d7f39401ecc9eecb4e82885e629 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Gustafsson <daniel@yesql.se>
+Date: Sat, 19 Jan 2019 00:42:47 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 3/3] smtp: avoid risk of buffer overflow in strtol
+
+If the incoming len 5, but the buffer does not have a termination
+after 5 bytes, the strtol() call may keep reading through the line
+buffer until is exceeds its boundary. Fix by ensuring that we are
+using a bounded read with a temporary buffer on the stack.
+
+Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
+---
+ lib/smtp.c | 8 ++++++--
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/lib/smtp.c
++++ b/lib/smtp.c
+@@ -255,8 +255,12 @@
+      Section 4. Examples of RFC-4954 but some e-mail servers ignore this and
+      only send the response code instead as per Section 4.2. */
+   if(line[3] == ' ' || len == 5) {
++    char tmpline[6];
++
+     result = TRUE;
+-    *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(line, NULL, 10));
++    memset(tmpline, '\0', sizeof(tmpline));
++    memcpy(tmpline, line, (len == 5 ? 5 : 3));
++    *resp = curlx_sltosi(strtol(tmpline, NULL, 10));
+ 
+     /* Make sure real server never sends internal value */
+     if(*resp == 1)